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NOTE
WILL THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE EVER BE
CLEAR? - Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co.
INTRODUCTION
The employment at-will doctrine is firmly entrenched in
North Carolina law.1 This doctrine provides that absent a contrac-
tual agreement between an employer and employee that estab-
lishes a definite term of employment, the employment is presumed
to be at-will.2 Employment at-will allows the employer to discharge
the employee with or without cause.3 Despite North Carolina's
commitment to the employment at-will doctrine, this doctrine has
been eroded in recent years by both the legislature and the judici-
ary. Several statutes were enacted to prohibit employers from dis-
charging at-will employees in retaliation for certain protected ac-
tivities.4 The North Carolina Court of Appeals also developed a
limited public policy exception to the at-will rule. 5 In Coman v.
Thomas Manufacturing Co.,6 the North Carolina Supreme Court
stretched this exception by broadly defining public policy. In Amos
v. Oakdale Knitting Co.,7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
1. Haburjak v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 293, 299 (W.D.N.C.
1991).
2. Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1971).
3. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 80, 221 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1976).
4. Filing workers' compensation claims, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985); en-
gaging in labor disputes, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-83 (1985); filing Occupational
Safety and Health Act claims, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-103(8) (1985).
5. See Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C. App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423 (1988)
(employer could not discharge employee who testified truthfully in response to a
subpoena); Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985) (em-
ployer could not discharge employee who refused to commit perjury), disc. review
denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985).
6. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
7. 102 N.C. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 565 (1991).
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helped define the parameters of the public policy exception to the
employment at-will doctrine. The court held that the public policy
exception could not be extended to prevent an employer from dis-
charging employees who refused to work for less than minimum
wage.' The court in Amos determined that the discharged employ-
ees could not bring a wrongful termination claim, but instead were
limited to whatever statutory rights they might have.' The court
refused to extend the exception to provide a cause of action in ad-
dition to a statutory remedy. 10 Thus, the decision in Amos nar-
rowed the public policy exception.
This Note will trace the cases following Coman and the confu-
sion among the North Carolina courts in determining an em-
ployer's liability for discharging an at-will employee. Next, this
Note will explain the rationale behind those decisions and how the
court of appeals arrived at its holding in Amos. This Note will also
show how the Amos decision can be reconciled with other case law
in North Carolina. Finally, this Note will conclude with issues for
attorneys to consider before pursuing a wrongful discharge claim
based on the public policy exception.
THE CASE
Plaintiffs Sharon Amos, Kathy Hall, and Earline Marshall
were employed by defendant Oakdale Knitting Company."' After
completing work one week, plaintiffs learned that their hourly
wage had been reduced to $1.17 below the North Carolina mini-
mum wage. 2 They complained to their supervisor who referred
them to defendant Walter Mooney, an owner of the defendant
company.' 3 Mooney gave the plaintiffs a choice: they could work at
the reduced pay rate or they would be fired.' 4 When plaintiffs re-
fused to work, their employment was terminated. 5
Plaintiffs filed suit, basing their wrongful discharge claim on
the employer's violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour
Act."' The lower court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for fail-
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 784, 403 S.E.2d at 567-568.
11. Id. at 783, 403 S.E.2d at 566.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-25.1 - 95-229 (1985).
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ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' 7 While
admitting that the discharges violated the public policy of North
Carolina, the trial judge stated that under the appellate court's de-
cision in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.,18 the public policy
exception was limited to where an employer attempts to interfere
with testimony in a legal proceeding. 19
After the North Carolina Supreme Court ,reversed the decision
in Coman, the plaintiffs in Amos appealed their decision. 0 On ap-
peal, plaintiffs contended that the North Carolina Supreme Court
adopted a broader public policy exception by reversing the court of
appeals' decision in Coman.21 Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that
their complaint stated a claim for relief for wrongful termination.22
The court of appeals rejected this claim and held that the public
policy' exception could not be extended to permit an action for
wrongful discharge where the plaintiffs already had a statutory
remedy.23
BACKGROUND
Until the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision of Sides
v. Duke University,24 North Carolina strictly adhered to the em-
ployment at-will doctrine.2 5 This doctrine provides that arl em-
17. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 783, 403 S.E.2d at 566. Dismissal was pursuant to
N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
18. 91 N.C. App. 327, 371 S.E.2d 731 (1988).
19. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 784, 403 S.E.2d at 566.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 784, 403 S.E.2d at 567. Although defendants contended that plain-
tiffs' action was preempted by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
201 - 219, the court refused to address the issue since it was not raised before the
lower court. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 784, 403 S.E.2d at 566.
23. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 568. The court of appeals also
stated:
by this opinion we do not in any way condone an employer's violation of
the minimum wage law with the resultant hardship and inconvenience to
its employees, and we expressly denounce such unlawful coercive at-
tempts to deprive employees of the wages to which they are lawfully
entitled.
Id. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 567.
24. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985), disc. review denied, 314 N.C.
331, 335 S.E.2d 13 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987);
Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Smith v. Ford Motor Co.,
289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403
(1971).
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ployer or employee can terminate the employment relationship at
will in the absence of a contract fixing a definite period of employ-
ment.2" The Sides court judicially created a public policy exception
to the at-will rule, by recognizing a cause of action for wrongful
discharge when an employer terminates an at-will employee "for
an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public policy. '27
The North Carolina Legislature also modified the doctrine by cre-
ating exceptions for certain retaliatory discharges.28
Following the Sides decision, the courts strictly construed the
public policy exception by limiting it to the same facts in Sides.
Thus, the public policy exception applied only where an employer
discharged its employee for refusing to commit perjury.29 As a re-
sult, only one other discharged employee was successful in bringing
a wrongful discharge claim based on the public policy exception."0
Expressing dismay over the impact of Sides, one commentator
stated, "[wihile Sides opened the door to wrongful discharge in
North Carolina, the subsequent cases have sorely missed the
mark.""'
Eventually, the North Carolina Supreme Court extended the
Sides public policy exception in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing
26. Note, Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co.: Recognizing a Public Policy Exception
to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 68 N.C.L. REV. 1178, 1181 (1990).
27. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826.
28. An employer cannot terminate an employee for filing for workers' com-
pensation, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1985), involvement in labor disputes, id. § 95-
83 (1985), filing OSHA claims, id. § 95-130(8), filing wage and hour complaints, id.
§ 96-25(20), or testifying at an unemployment compensation hearing, id. § 96-
15.1.
29. Note, supra note 26, at 1186-87. See Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79
N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986) (employee who was discharged for refusing
to accede to sexual demands of a more favored employee did not fall within the
Sides exception), disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986);
Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617 (1986) (employee who
was discharged for complying with statute did not fall within the Sides excep-
tion), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986); Walker v. Westing-
house, 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985) (employee who was discharged for
raising safety concerns in the workplace did not fall within the Sides exception)
disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39 (1986).
30. See Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C. App. 35, 370 S.E.2d 423 (1988)
(employee was discharged for testifying truthfully in response to a subpoena).
31. McGuiness, The Doctrine of Wrongful Discharge in North Carolina: The
Confusing Path From Sides to Guy and the Need for Reform, 10 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 217, 246 (1988).
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Co.32 The court in Coman held that an at-will. employee, who was
discharged for refusing to operate a truck in violation of federal
law, had stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on
the public policy exception."3 The court noted that public policy
has been defined as "the principle of law which holds that no citi-
zen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public or against the public good."'34 The supreme court went
further to state that "bad faith conduct should not be tolerated in
employment relations, just as it is not accepted in other commer-
cial relationships." 35 Since the court defined public policy broadly
and discussed "bad faith," the scope of its exception was feared
too large. 6
However, after Coman, the court of appeals decided the case
of McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp.37 in which the court
interpreted Coman narrowly. The plaintiff in McLaughlin claimed
that he was fired for attempting to defend himself when another
employee punched him in the chest.3 8 The court held that Mc-
Laughlin's discharge did not fall within the public policy excep-
tion.39 In reaching its decision, the court focused on the previous
32. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
33. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
34. Id. at 175 n.2, 381 S.E.2d at 447 n.2 (quoting Petermann v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)).
35. Coman, 325 N.C. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448.
36. The dissenting justice argued that the majority's decision "may indeed
have an effect on the economic vitality of our state, particularly on the recruit-
ment of new industry." Coman, 325 N.C. at 184, 381 S.E.2d at 452 (1991) (Meyer,
J., dissenting).
One commentator noted that "the supreme court has created an overly broad
public policy exception and bad faith exception that will encourage numerous
plaintiff-employee lawsuits and increase the cost of doing business to employers."
Note, supra note 26, at 1178.
37. 95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836 (1989).
38. Id. at 303, 382 S.E.2d at 838. McLaughlin had counseled another Bar-
clays employee about his work performance. After the employee became argumen-
tative, McLaughlin tried to leave the room. The employee punched McLaughlin
in the chest. In order to defend himself, McLaughlin threw up his right hand and
struck the employee on the side of the face. Barclays conducted no formal investi-
gation of the altercation nor had it responded to previous requests from Mc-
Laughlin for assistance in dealing with the employee. Five days after the alterca-
tion, Barclays terminated McLaughlin's employment, offering no explanation. Id.
at 303-304, 382 S.E.2d at 837-838.
39. Id. at 307, 382 S.E.2d at 840.
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cases in which the public policy exception had been applied. 0 The
court noted that those cases involved employers who affirmatively
instructed the employees to violate the law and were concerned
with the potential harm to the public if those instructions were
obeyed.41 The McLaughlin court simply did not believe similar
public policy implications were present in the case before it.
42
The next development in the Coman public policy exception
occurred in Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel Stores, inc.
43
The plaintiff was discharged for refusing her employer's request
for sex." She argued that her discharge was in bad faith and fell
within the public policy exception of Coman since the employer's
sexual harassment constituted a violation of federal and state pub-
lic policy.45 The federal district court stated that North Carolina
courts would rule that the public policy exception requires two fac-
tors: (1) that the discharge violates some well established public
policy; and (2) there be no remedy to protect the interest of the
aggrieved employee or society.46 Since the plaintiff had a remedy
available under Title VII, the court held that the discharge did not
fall within the public policy exception.47
The plaintiff appealed the district court's decision to the
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.4 8 This court re-
versed the district court, holding that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action for wrongful discharge because she was asked to commit an
act prohibited by criminal law.49 The court also objected to the two
factor "test" used by the district court in determining whether the
40. Id. at 306, 382 S.E.2d at 839.
41. Id. at 306, 383 S.E.2d at 840.
42. Id.
43. 724 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
44. Id. at 1192.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1193.
47. Id. The court also cited cases that refused to extend a commor) law tort
remedy for reasons of public policy where the law already provided some protec-
tion against wrongful discharge: Lapindad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679
F. Supp. 991, 993 (D. Haw. 1988); Salazar v. Furr's Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403, 1408
(D. N.M. 1986); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1054 (E.D. Pa.
1977). Harrison, 724 F. Supp. at 1192.
48. Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir.
1991).
49. Id. at 534. The court stated "[w]e think it apparent that the exchange of
sexual intercourse for the valuable economic benefit of a job fits within North
Carolina's criminal prohibition" of prostitution. Id.
[Vol. 14:123
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public policy exception should apply.50 Although the court had no
objection to the first factor, it found no North Carolina authority
for the second.' The court noted that the employee in Coman had
a remedy in federal court, but that the North Carolina Supreme
Court deemed that fact irrelevant in recognizing the existence of a
state remedy.2
A recent case addressing the public policy exception examined
the legal consequences when an employee is fired for performing
an act required by law.53 While working as a broker, plaintiff re-
ported to his employer that other employees were engaging in in-
sider trading. 4 Soon after this revelation, the employer discharged
the plaintiff.5 Since the law requires brokers to disclose the exis-
tence of insider trading, plaintiff argued that the Coman exception
should also apply when an employee is fired for doing that which is
required by law.5 6
The federal district court, however, held that the public policy
exception was limited to situations where an employer affirma-
tively instructs an employee to violate the law.57 The court also
noted that the "bad faith" language of Coman was "unfortunate
and destined to lead to the inclusion of a wrongful discharge claim
to virtually every employment termination lawsuit."58 Surprisingly
however, the courts have not focused on the "bad faith" language
in Coman, but instead have based the exception on public policy
grounds.59
ANALYSIS
In Amos, the North Carolina Court of Appeals had a second
opportunity to determine the breadth of the public policy excep-
50. Id. at 533.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Haburjak v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 293 (W.D.N.C.
1991).
54. Id. at 294.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 301.
58. Id. at 300.
59. See Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 102 N.C. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 565
(1991); Haburjak, 759 F. Supp. 293; Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc.,
924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991); and McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., 95
N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836 (1989).
1991]
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tion articulated in Coman.6 The court held that the public policy
exception could not be extended to provide a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when the discharged employee already had a
statutory remedy." While acknowledging that payment of the min-
imum wage is the public policy of North Carolina, the court
pointed out that the legislature had provided a remedy for employ-
ees who were not paid according to the Wage and Hour Act.6 2 The
court distinguished this case from Coman by noting that the plain-
tiff in Coman did not have an available statutory remedy in the
North Carolina court.6 3
The court of appeals' rationale focused on the fact that the
employees were not asked to engage in unlawful conduct and that
the employer's violation of the Wage and Hour Act did not pose a
serious threat to the public's safety." The court also considered
the purpose of the Wage and Hour Act which is to allow employees
to earn acceptable wages without jeopardizing the competitive po-
sition of North Carolina business and industry.6
In citing cases that support limiting the public policy excep-
tion to those instances when an employee has no statutory redress,
the court in Amos indicated that it agreed with the district court's
"two factor test" in Harrison."" The Amos court cited Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp.67 and quoted the following language from that
opinion: "application of the public policy exception requires two
60. The court had its first opportunity in McLaughlin v. Barclays American
Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836 (1989).
61. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 785-787, 403 S.E.2d at 567-68. The dissenting
justice agreed that plaintiffs did not have a cause of action for wrongful termina-
tion, but he would have reversed the dismissal to permit the plaintiffs to pursue
their remedy under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.22. Id. at 787, 403 S.E.2d at 568.
62. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 785, 403 S.E.2d at 567. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-
25.22 allows an employee to maintain an action in the general court of justice to
recover unpaid minimum wages plus interest, and allows the court to award exem-
plary damages in the amount of the recovery and to award costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees to the employee. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.22 (a),(b),(d) (1985).
63. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 785, 403 S.E.2d at 567. The supreme court in
Coman stated that while plaintiff had a possible remedy in the federal courts, the
open courts clause of the North Carolina Constitution (N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18)
required the court to provide a forum to determine a valid cause of action. Coman
v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 174, 381 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1989).
64. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 567.
65. Id.
66. 724 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
67. 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd as modified, 619 F.2d 276 (3d
Cir. 1980).
130 [Vol. 14:123
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factors: (1) that the discharge violate some well-established public
policy; and (2) that there be no remedy to protect the interest of
the aggrieved employee or society."68 Since the employees in Amos
had a statutory remedy, the public policy exception could not
apply.
While the Amos court attempted to help define the parame-
ters of the public policy exception, it left many questions still un-
answered. For example, the court did not have to determine
whether the employer's violation of the Wage and Hour Act was a
violation of public policy. 9 Thus, the question of what constitutes
a discharge that violates public policy remains unclear. From the
cases that have addressed the employment at-will doctrine so far,
it appears that the exception is limited to those policies supported
by criminal statutes and regulations.70 One court recently noted
that a question remains as to whether the exception could apply
when the employee is fired for refusing to perform a non-criminal
act that violates public policy. 71
Also, the question of whether industry standards or rules of
ethical conduct could serve as sources of public policy has not been
determined. 7 Furthermore, the courts have left open the question
whether violations of federal public policy can form the basis for a
wrongful discharge action in state courts, provided that the em-
ployee has no statutory protection.73
As seen from the cases following Coman, the North Carolina
courts are trying to adhere to the employment at-will doctrine by
68. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 787, 403 S.E.2d at 568.
69. Id. at 787, 403 S.E.2d at 567-68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.1(b) states: "The
public policy of this State is declared as follows: The wage levels of employees,
hours of labor, payment of earned wages, and the well-being of minors are sub-
jects of concern requiring legislation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.1(b) (1985).
70. Such reasoning would explain why the plaintiff in McLaughlin, who did
not cite any statutes or regulations, was unsuccessful in his wrongful discharge
suit.
71. Percell v. International Business Machs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.C.
1991).
72. See Note, supra note 26, at 1188.
73. In Coman, the supreme court expressly stated that it did not base its
opinion upon federal public policy but that many courts have allowed wrongful
discharge claims based on violations of federal public policy. Coman v. Thomas
Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 178, 381 S.E.2d 445, 449 (1989). In the cases cited, how-
ever, the federal statutes did not provide protection for a wrongful discharge.
Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (M.D.N.C.
1989).
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restricting the application of the public policy exception. The
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, applied the excep-
tion in Harrison and has been the only court to do so since the
Coman decision.7 ' The Harrison court provided the plaintiff a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in addition to a remedy
under Title VII.75 This result is directly opposite the North Caro-
lina Court of Apppeals' decision in Amos to the extent that the
public policy exception did not extend to afford a cause of action
when the employees had a statutory remedy. 76 Even so, these two
cases can be reconciled by looking carefully at the fact situations.
In Harrison, the plaintiff was asked to commit an act prohib-
ited by the criminal law,7 whereas the plaintiffs in Amos were not
asked to violate the law.7" This difference is an important one since
it appears that courts do not want to alter the employment at-will
doctrine any more than is necessary to protect the public welfare. 79
The primary reason for the judicial exception was to discourage
employers from forcing their employees to choose between break-
ing the law or losing their job.80 Another factual difference between
the two cases was that the plaintiff in Harrison had a federal rem-
edy," while the plaintiffs in Amos had a state remedy. 2 Evidently,
the courts do not believe they are justified to act as "super-legisla-
tures" and provide an additional state remedy. Whereas, when a
plaintiff has only a federal remedy, the courts are more inclined to
74. Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir.
1991).
75. Id. at 533.
76. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 102 N.C. App. 782, 786, 403 S.E.2d 565,
567-68 (1991).
77. Harrison, 924 F.2d at 534.
78. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 786, 403 S.E.2d at 568.
79. See McLaughlin v. Barclay Am. Corp., 95 N.C. App. at 301, 306, 382
S.E.2d 836, 840 (1989) (court stated, "[w]e do not perceive the kind of deleterious
consequences for the general public, if we uphold Barclays' action, as might have
resulted from decisions favorable to the employers in Sides and Coman").
80. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 176, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447-
48 (1989) (court stated, "[wie find it is in the best interest of the state on behalf
of its citizens to encourage employees to refrain from violating... public policy at
the demand of their employers. Providing employees with a remedy should they
be discharged for refusing to violate ... public policy supplies that
encouragement").
81. Harrison, 924 F.2d at 533. The court recognized that there is no North
Carolina statute analogous to Title VII. Id.
82. Amos, 102 N.C. App. at 785, 403 S.E.2d at 567.
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provide a state remedy. 83
In a case following Amos, the plaintiff argued that his termi-
nation was in violation of North Carolina's public policy against
race discrimination as embodied in the North Carolina Equal Em-
ployment Practices Act.8 4 The district court held that there is no
evidence that the North Carolina courts would expand the public
policy exception to apply in almost every employment discrimina-
tion suit.,5 The state courts would probably agree with this deci-
sion since the employer's action was not a violation of a criminal
statute and provided that the employee had a statutory remedy.
Such a result would also prevent the exception from swallowing
the rule.
Perhaps the North Carolina Court of Appeals' reluctance to
apply the public policy exception in Amos stems from its desire to
promote industry and development in North Carolina. If an em-
ployee prevails on a wrongful discharge claim, he can recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages that are unavailable under the
statutory provisions.8 6 Thus, an employee can receive a substan-
tially larger damage award in a wrongful discharge case.8 Clearly,
the court is protecting employers' interests by narrowly interpret-
ing the Coman decision so as to prevent employees from bringing a
wrongful discharge claim.
The Amos decision, in effect, insulates employers from wrong-,
ful discharge claims when they pay employees less than minimum
wage. Employers risk only having to pay the discharged employees
the difference between the minimum wage and the actual wage
paid. 8 Meanwhile, an employee must take the initiative of hiring a
lawyer and filing suit against the employer.
The Amos court determined that the plaintiffs' two options
were (1) to continue working and pursue their statutory remedy,
83. See Coman, 325 N.C. at 174, 381 S.E.2d at 446 (court stated, "[ajlthough
plaintiff may have some additional remedy in the federal courts, the courts of
North Carolina cannot fail to provide a forum to determine a valid cause of
action").
84. Percell v. International Business Machs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.C.
1991).
85. Id.
86. McGuiness, supra note 31, at 234.
87. See id. at 235.
88. Employers would also pay interest on the difference and might have to
pay exemplary damages in the amount of the recovery as well as costs and attor-
neys' fees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.22 (1985).
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which would have made them whole, or (2) to refuse to work and
be fired.89 However, the court failed to consider that the employees
may have been unaware of their statutory remedy until after they
were discharged and had consulted a lawyer. If that were the case,
it was unfortunate that the plaintiffs had to suffer the consequence
of losing their jobs.
CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Court of Appeals re-examined the public
policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine in the Amos
case. The court held that the exception could not extend to pro-
vide a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharged
employee already had a statutory remedy. After Amos it appears
that when an employee has been discharged in violation of public
policy and there is no statutory remedy available, the courts will
apply the public policy exception to allow a cause of action for
wrongful discharge.
As long as business exists, North Carolina courts will continue
* to balance employers' freedom to hire and fire with employees' de-
sire to maintain employment. Attorneys should be aware that pur-
suing statutory remedies are a wrongfully discharged employee's
safest bet. It is also important for attorneys to note that courts
which have applied the public policy exception have done so only
in cases where an employer requested an employee to perform an
act harmful to the public interest. While the holding in Amos
helped define the contours of the public policy exception, the court
left many questions unanswered. Thus, until more cases are heard,
an employer's liability for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy remains unclear.
Victoria W. Shelton
89. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 102 N.C. App. 782, 786, 403 S.E.2d 565,
567 (1991).
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